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Rand on the Atonement
A Critique
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ABSTRACT: In March 1964, Ayn Rand sat down for an interview with Playboy. 
In it, Rand argued that Christ’s atoning sacrifice—if it happened—was morally 
wrong. The author contends that Rand made a bad argument. Depending on 
how her words are interpreted, Rand’s argument for the immorality of Christ’s 
atonement was based on (a) at least one false premise or (b) a “bait-and-
switch” fallacy. Either way, the argument fails and should be abandoned.
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Hugh Hefner and Jesus Christ. Two men whose names are rarely seen together 
in print. And the former, throughout the history of Playboy, was careful to avoid 
criticizing the latter in the pages of his magazine. For sure, Hefner fancied himself 
a public intellectual. And like all self-appointed intellectuals, he fancied himself 
an able commentator on religion in America. And commentate he did. Through 
Playboy’s articles, cartoons, essays, responses to letters to the editor, and inter-
views, Hefner poked fun at the American church for being too closed-minded 
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though “Hefner subtly attacked biblical myths . . . he was careful not to actually 
satirize Jesus, perhaps to avoid backlash” (12). Playboy may have thrived on fight-
ing censorship and stirring the pot, but the magazine had its limits. And, for the 
most part, Jesus was one of them. Nevertheless, there were exceptions to this rule. 
And Ayn Rand’s 1964 interview with Playboy’s Alvin Toffler was one of them:
Now you want me to speak about the cross. What is correct is that I do 
regard the cross as the symbol of the sacrifice of the ideal to the nonideal. 
Isn’t that what it does mean? Christ, in terms of the Christian philosophy, is 
the human ideal. He personifies that which men should strive to emulate. 
Yet, according to the Christian mythology, he died on the cross not for his 
own sins but for the sins of the nonideal people. In other words, a man of 
perfect virtue was sacrificed for men who are vicious and who are expected 
or supposed to accept that sacrifice. If I were a Christian, nothing could 
make me more indignant than that: the notion of sacrificing the ideal to 
the nonideal, or virtue to vice. And it is in the name of that symbol that 
men are asked to sacrifice themselves for their inferiors. That is precisely 
how the symbolism is used. That is torture. (Rand in Toffler 1964, 39–40)
According to a 2009 biography by Anne C. Heller, Rand’s comment on the 
atonement in her widely read Playboy interview was “perhaps the purest, 
least rhetorical, and hardest-hitting statement of her views,” a statement that 
“reached two and a half million people, mostly men, and brought countless new 
readers to her novels and nonfiction” (Heller 2009, 324). The mere possibility 
that this article has left any residue makes a critical response well overdue.
Despite its philosophical shortsightedness, some parts of her comment are 
entirely unobjectionable. It is important to identify these instances lest we acci-
dentally throw the baby out with the bathwater. Rand correctly sums up the 
Christian doctrine that the person of Christ is “the human ideal . . . which men 
should strive to emulate.” Passages such as Hebrews 4:15 emphasize that even 
though Jesus struggled with the same temptations as we do, he managed to 
remain perfectly sinless. And passages like 1 Peter 2:21 tell us that we are called 
to emulate Christ’s perfect example. It is also accurate to say that “he died on the 
cross not for his own sins but for the sins of non-ideal people.” Furthermore, 
Rand is not wrong in claiming that the cross is a symbol of “torture.” However, 
Rand clearly doesn’t mean “torture” in the literal sense of a Roman scourg-
ing and public crucifixion. She is arguing instead that the Christian virtue of 
self-sacrifice represented in the cross, when applied consistently, results in a 
contorted inner life, tantamount to torture. A controversial claim no doubt, but 
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However, Rand’s brief comment pits her philosophy directly against the cen-
tral event of the Christian story (unsurprising from a woman who wanted to be 
known as “the greatest enemy of religion”) (Rand [9 April 1934] in Harriman 
1997, 68). This means that even if Rand became convinced of the truth of 
Christianity on her deathbed, by the guidelines of her own philosophy she 
would be unable to become a Christian on moral grounds. In this paper, I aim 
to show that Rand’s attack on the atonement fails due to at least due to at least 
one of the following:
A. a false premise
B. a “bait-and-switch” fallacy
The (Re)definition of Sacrifice
In Rand’s epistemology, definitions are no small thing. They are, in her words, 
“the guardians of rationality, the first line of defense against the chaos of mental 
disintegration” (Rand, 1975, 69). In plain English—and a smidge of Latin—
Rand held, with Aristotle, that a definition must include the kind of thing 
that its object belongs to (its genus) and that which differentiates it from other 
members of its kind (its differentia). For example, Atlas Shrugged belongs to 
the genus “novel,” and is differentiated from other novels by its particular plot, 
theme, and rhetorical panache.
According to the 1968 college edition of The Random House Dictionary of the 
English Language, a dictionary used by both Rand and Leonard Peikoff on sep-
arate occasions (Rand 1975, v; Peikoff [1991] 1993, 214), the definition of “sac-
rifice” (as a noun and in a normative context) is, “the surrender or destruction 
of something of value for the sake of greater gain” (Urdang and Fletcher 1968, 
1160). The genus of “sacrifice” is “the surrender or destruction of something of 
value,” and the differentia lies in the fact that the “something of value” is being 
given up “for the sake of greater gain.”
By contrast, Rand, in The Virtue of Selfishness, redefines sacrifice as, “The 
surrender of a greater value for the sake of a lesser one or of a non-value.” Here, 
Rand keeps the genus the same, but replaces the differentia.1 Peikoff similarly 
redefines sacrifice as, “the surrender of a value, such as money, loved ones, free-
dom, for the sake of a lesser value (if one acquires an equal or greater value 
from a transaction, then it is an even trade or a gain, not a sacrifice)” (Peikoff 
[1991] 1993, 232).
The important takeaway here is that Rand, Peikoff, and most Objectivists 
since are operating under a new definition of “sacrifice”—one foreign to most 
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Objectivism and Christ’s Atonement
The doctrine of the atonement: All Christians profess to believe it, but seldom 
do they agree on what exactly it means. But to judge whether Rand’s criticism 
of the atonement was a good one, we must first get a vague understanding of 
what the atonement is.
Simply put, atonement is the means by which God makes possible the rec-
onciliation of humanity to God so we humans may enter into harmonious rela-
tionship with him. And what were those means? It has something to do with 
Jesus dying for our sins. Jesus died, and reconciliation became possible. But, on 
the face of it, it’s unclear what Jesus dying could do to bring this about. The task 
of Christian theologians, then, is to explain what kind of an impact the death of 
Jesus could have on making possible our salvation.
As with any important question to which the answer is not immediately obvious, 
several different theories have been offered throughout history to try and resolve 
the problem. Below are the five major theories of atonement in historical order.
The Christus Victor Theory
The earliest model of the atonement has come to be known as the Christus 
Victor model (Christus as in “Christ” and Victor as in “victorious”). As the name 
suggests, this theory asserts that Christ’s death was victorious over the powers 
of sin and evil that hold humanity in their dominion. Christ’s death, on this 
view, is the decisive moment of victory against the powers of evil. What exactly 
this means is a matter of dispute. Some have taken a very literal understanding, 
arguing that Christ’s death was a very literal payment to Satan in exchange for 
his freeing humanity from his bondage. This is often portrayed as an ingenious 
trick on God’s part. Christ’s becoming human gave Satan the mistaken impres-
sion that although he was the second person of the Trinity, Christ was now as 
weak, frail, and powerless as all the other humans in Satan’s bondage. So, Satan, 
when he gleefully accepted Christ’s death in exchange for humanity, believed he 
had triumphed over God. But Christ then broke free from Hell, breaking Satan’s 
hold on humanity forever. Another version of Christus Victor (sometimes called 
the political model of Christus Victor) is uncomfortable with Christ’s atonement 
being all about Satan. Rather than holding that Christ’s death was a ransom 
payment to Satan, these theorists hold instead that Christ was the victim of an 
act of violence by Satan. This act of violence was in strict violation of Christ’s 
rights, meaning that Satan had overstepped his own. Therefore, God was fully 
within his rights in forcibly liberating humanity from Satan’s clutches. In any 
case, theories that take a Christus Victor approach distinguish themselves from 
other theories of atonement with their claim that Christ’s atonement, in one 
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The Satisfaction Theory
This theory comes courtesy of Saint Anselm of Canterbury in his great essay 
Cur Deus Homo (Why God Became Man) (Anselm [1098] 2008, 265–356) and 
is the dominant view within the Catholic Church today. Satisfaction theorists 
argue, appealing to God’s justice, that it would be wrong for God to allow sin 
to go unpunished. It seems to follow from this that Christ’s death was neces-
sary to satisfy the moral demands brought about by God’s justice. Hence, the 
satisfaction theory. On this view, justice, which is grounded in God’s nature, has 
been violated by sin. This justice demands some sort of satisfaction or compen-
sation. Therefore, God’s nature allows for only two possibilities: punishment or 
compensation by some other means. Justice, however, is not the only attribute 
of God at play. Just as God is perfectly just in nature, he is also perfectly merci-
ful. Therefore, since punishment would result in humanity’s eternal damnation, 
God mercifully takes the second alternative: compensation. On the satisfac-
tion theory, Christ’s death acts as a restitution for God that both satisfies God’s 
justice and exempts man from the certainty of eternal torment. The question 
then arises of why only Jesus is suited to play the role of compensator. This is 
answerable only once we understand that by “compensation,” satisfaction theo-
rists mean “the voluntary payment of a debt.” This means that as a result of sin, 
man owes God a debt of restitution. However, since man, even in the absence 
of sin, already owes everything to God, no mere mortal can possibly pay this 
debt. Yet the plot thickens. For, according to Anselm, only a human can pay this 
debt since man is guilty of the sin that violates God’s justice. So, what we need, 
then, is a human who is not merely a human. And that’s where the question 
“Why God became man?” comes in. Anselm answers that since ordinary sin-
ners cannot make restitution for their debts, and since only humans can qualify 
for the role of compensator, the only hope for humanity’s eternal destiny is that 
the debt be paid by a sinless human. Therefore, the satisfaction theorist argues, 
God becoming incarnate in the person of Jesus Christ is the only way to solve 
the problem of compensation.
The Moral Influence Theory
This theory embodies the controversial claim that Christ’s death holds no meta-
physical significance whatsoever. First advocated by twelfth-century logician 
Peter Abelard, it contends that Christ’s sacrifice on the cross showed the extent 
to which God was willing to go to reconcile humanity to himself. This demon-
stration, for those who sincerely and open-heartedly dwell upon it, is so moving 
that it will draw them to genuine repentance and contrition before God. On 
Abelard’s view, God does not need to be reconciled with humanity. Rather, it 
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reconciled to God. This view, as enunciated by Abelard, holds that the moral 
influence of the atonement is the only reason why Christ died on the cross. 
Although most theologians reject the seemingly radical view that the moral 
influence is the central rationale for Christ’s death, many wish to incorporate 
moral influence as a subset of their atonement theory. While the primary end 
of the atonement may not be moral influence, it might well play an important, 
secondary role in bringing people to Christ. After all, of all the historical events 
that have had an influence on Western culture, what has had more of an impact 
on art and literature than the death of Christ? While there is disagreement as 
to whether moral influence was the sole point of Christ’s death, there is a broad 
consensus that moral influence is an important facet of any adequate atonement 
theory.
Penal Substitution
The satisfaction view laid out in Cur Deus Homo is seen by some as the precur-
sor to this next theory. However, while substitution theorists agree with Anselm 
that Christ’s death was needed to satisfy the demands of God’s justice, they 
reject his distinction between punishment and compensation. The theory was 
first developed by the early Protestant reformers (Martin Luther, John Calvin, 
and the like) who held that Christ voluntarily suffered the suffering and died 
the death that was due to mankind as punishment for their sins. In so doing, 
God cancelled any punishment that was due to the beneficiaries of Christ’s sac-
rifice. How? According to the reformers, Christ became “forensically” guilty in 
place of mankind. To better understand this idea, think of court rulings that 
invoke “legal fictions” (assertions that are accepted as true for legal purposes, 
even though they may be untrue or unverified). Obviously, it’s not literally true 
that Christ was morally blameworthy for sins he didn’t commit. Instead, what 
is imputed onto Christ is not the sins of other people but the legal guilt for the 
sins of other people. Christ did not actually commit the sins of the human race 
but he allowed God to treat him as though he did. This “legal fiction,” on the 
penal substitutionary view, is used by God to bring about the desirable effects of 
the atonement. In this way, Christ, much like the lambs of Old Testament ritual 
sacrifice, is sacrificed in the place of the guilty humans who are deserving of 
that punishment. Thus, argues the substitution theorist, Christ’s sacrifice on the 
cross was able to satisfy the demands of God’s justice and of his mercy.
The Governmental Theory
The fifth and final major atonement theory is usually attributed to the esteemed 
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of penal substitution. Like substitution theorists, Grotius held that Christ was 
in fact punished by God and that that punishment was due to the retributive 
demands of God’s justice. However, unlike the defenders of penal substitution, 
Grotius held not only that Christ was personally innocent, but that he was also 
legally innocent as well. Furthermore, on this view, God has the ability to remit 
sins even without punishment. So why did God punish Christ if he could have 
remitted our sins in the first place, for free? Grotius holds that although God 
could have done this, he had good reasons not to do so. The atonement, while 
not strictly necessary, was fitting given the circumstances. God punishing Christ 
instead of us is seen by Grotius as a relaxation of the punishment that human-
ity deserved. God saw it as fitting to relax the punishment due to humanity by 
punishing Christ in its place because not doing so would result, ultimately, in the 
condemnation of humanity. At this point, an objector might wonder why God, if 
he was able to relax his punishment for humanity, did not then relax his punish-
ment for Christ and not punish anyone at all. Governmental theorists respond 
by arguing that by punishing Christ in the way that he did, God was putting on 
public display the righteous justice of God and the severity of sin. Surmises one 
commentator, on Grotius’s view, “God, by accepting Christ’s death, preserves 
the visible moral order of the world, of which he is governor” (Hare 2005, 554).
The Argument
Despite their differences, all theories hold that Christ’s death either influenced 
or made possible the salvation of human persons. While theologians may dis-
agree on whether God is able to forgive sins even if his justice is unsatisfied, 
or on whether these theories ought to be mixed together, forming new, more 
robust accounts, all agree on one key point: the atonement does not involve “the 
surrender of a greater value for the sake of a lesser one or of a non-value.” In all 
atonement theories, Christ voluntarily takes on a vast amount of suffering (his 
worldly comfort being the lesser value that is sacrificed) so that many of his cre-
ated humans will be able to spend eternity in his company. The Bible declares 
that “God is love” (1 John 4:8; 1 John 4:16) and makes clear that much of this love 
is directed toward humanity (see Isaiah 54:10). According to Rand, “to love is 
to value” (Rand 1964, 35). From this, it seems perfectly plausible to imagine that 
Christ valued the reconciliation of man to God over the suffering caused by the 
physical torture and temporary separation from God that he would endure as 
a result of his sacrifice.
Therefore, it seems, Rand’s argument against Christianity relies on a simple 
“bait-and-switch”—a logical fallacy in which an audience is “baited” by the defi-
nition of a word, a word that is then redefined (“switched”) to draw a faulty con-
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In a 2006 paper for The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies, Robert H. Bass accuses 
Rand of committing a “bait-and-switch” on the definition of “altruism” (Bass 
2006). I, on the other hand, accuse Rand of playing bait-and-switch with “sacri-
fice.” To see the fallacy in action, let’s put Rand’s argument into syllogistic form:
1. All instances of sacrifice are immoral.
2. Christ’s atonement was an instance of sacrifice.
3. Therefore, Christ’s atonement was immoral.
This argument may be structurally valid, but it involves equivocating on the 
only word that is common to both (1) and (2). If Rand is using her newfangled 
definition of sacrifice in (1) but the traditional definition in (2), then she is 
guilty of a bait-and-switch. If she is using the traditional definition in (1) but the 
newfangled definition in (2), then she is guilty of the same crime.
If, however, she is using the same definition in (1) and (2), then she is guilty 
of at least one false premise. Suppose, for example, that Rand is using the tradi-
tional definition in both (1) and (2). If so, then (1) seems manifestly implausible. 
Why should there be anything wrong with giving up a lesser value for the sake 
of a greater one? Indeed, Nathaniel Branden writes in The Virtue of Selfishness 
that “if one gives up that which one does not value in order to obtain that which 
one does value—or if one gives up a lesser value in order to obtain a greater 
one—this is not a sacrifice, but a gain” (“Mental Health versus Mysticism and 
Self-Sacrifice” in Rand 1964, 45; emphasis original).
On the other hand, if Rand is using her newfangled definition of “sacrifice” 
in both (1) and (2) then she is guilty of another false premise; that being the 
claim that Christ’s atonement involved the surrender of a higher value in favor 
of a lower value or of a non-value. Clearly, in every mainstream understanding 
of the atonement illustrated above, Christ only ever gives up lesser values for 
the sake of higher ones.2
But suppose this is the argument that Rand was attempting to make. Suppose 
that Rand is using her newfangled definition in both premises of the argument. 
Suppose that Rand truly believes that Christ’s sacrifice involved the surrender 
of a higher value for the sake of a lesser one. What could she say in defense of 
this view? Well, in her essay “The Ethics of Emergencies,” Rand writes:
To illustrate this on the altruists’ favorite example: the issue of saving 
a drowning person. If the person to be saved is a stranger, it is morally 
proper to save him only when the danger to one’s own life is minimal; 
when the danger is great, it would be immoral to attempt it: only a lack 
of self-esteem could permit one to value one's life no higher than that 
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then the risk one should be willing to take is greater in proportion to 
the greatness of that person’s value to oneself. If it is the man or woman 
one loves, then one can be willing to give one’s own life to save him or 
her—for the selfish reason that life without the loved person would be 
unbearable. (in Rand 1964, 52)
Rand is saying that it’s wrong to risk one’s life for a stranger, though not neces-
sarily wrong to do so for a loved one, without whom life would be “unbearable.” 
Leaving aside whether this is actually true, there are a few things to be said 
about how her view relates to the atonement. Given that the God of Christianity 
is omniscient (minimally possessing knowledge of all true propositions), it is 
impossible that any human being is a stranger to God. Therefore, Rand’s argu-
ment against sacrificing oneself for the sake of a total stranger simply fails to 
apply to God. The God of the Bible intimately knows and loves all persons (past, 
present, and future). On the other hand, it would be questionable to claim that 
life for God without loving relationships with human beings would be “unbear-
able.” The biblical God is one being made up of three persons, each of whom 
loves the other two. The idea of life being “unbearable” for a maximally great 
being who is deficient in nothing borders on absurdity.
The solution to the problem seems to lie in emphasizing God’s immortality. 
The assumption underlying Rand’s view on whether giving up one’s life is morally 
improper is that all life ends at the grave. Rand, an atheist, held that no person is 
endowed with an immortal soul. However, if she is smuggling her atheistic worl-
dview into her moral assessment of a Christian narrative, then she has failed to 
engage properly with the Christian claim. Remember, Rand begins her statement 
with the conditional, “if I were a Christian” (by which she means, “if I believed 
Christianity were true”). If Rand were a Christian, then she certainly would 
not believe that a person dies when their physical body dies. By entertaining 
the counterfactual “if I were a Christian,” and simultaneously making atheistic 
assumptions about life, death, and immortality, Rand would be taking on a dis-
ingenuous position. Christ, in the Christian narrative, only dies a physical death 
on the cross. Therefore, the sacrificial death of Christ is in no way analogous to 
the person in Rand’s scenario for whom physical death marks the end of their 
existence. As William Lane Craig (2019) writes:
Christ does not cease to exist when he dies on the cross. Rand is 
assuming a naturalistic point of view and assuming that death marks the 
end of human existence. The end of a good man’s life is therefore the end 
of all the value he has. But on a Christian view Christ exists following the 
death of his mortal body and, moreover, he rises from the dead to eternal 




 http://scholarlypublishingcollective.org/psup/ayn-rand/article-pdf/21/1/31/1368977/jaynrandstud_21_1_31.pdf by guest on 22 D
ecem
ber 2021
40 T H E  J O U R N A L  O F  AY N  R A N D  ST U D I Es
JARS 21.1_03_Wollen.indd Page 40 12/05/21  8:40 PM JARS 21.1_03_Wollen.indd Page 41 12/05/21  8:40 PM
In conclusion, therefore, Rand’s only argument attacking a specifically Christian 
doctrine that is universally accepted across denominations involves fallacious 
reasoning and/or a false premise. It is plausible that Christ’s atonement, how-
ever it is construed, does not involve the surrender of a higher value for the sake 
of a lesser value or of a non-value. There is no reason to think that Christ was 
immoral for valuing his future relationship with humanity in heaven above the 
continuation of his human life on Earth.
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Notes
1. An anonymous reviewer has pointed out that Rand’s notion of “sacrifice” was cor-
relative to her notion of “altruism”—a notion that grew out of protest against the moral 
philosophy of August Comte. For a deeper dive into the Comte/Rand connection, see 
Campbell 2006.
2. The same, general point has been made, in passing, by Onar Åm, in a book review 
for this very journal (Åm 2020, 413).
3. I am grateful to Dr. Craig for this insight.
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